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ABSTRACT
While substantial effort has been devoted to understand fraudulent
activity in traditional online advertising (search and banner), more
recent forms such as video ads have received little attention. The
understanding and identification of fraudulent activity (i.e., fake
views) in video ads for advertisers, is complicated as they rely
exclusively on the detection mechanisms deployed by video hosting
portals. In this context, the development of independent tools able
to monitor and audit the fidelity of these systems are missing today
and needed by both industry and regulators.
In this paper we present a first set of tools to serve this purpose.
Using our tools, we evaluate the performance of the audit systems
of five major online video portals. Our results reveal that YouTube’s
detection system significantly outperforms all the others. Despite
this, a systematic evaluation indicates that it may still be susceptible
to simple attacks. Furthermore, we find that YouTube penalizes its
videos’ public and monetized view counters differently, the former
being more aggressive. This means that views identified as fake and
discounted from the public view counter are still monetized. We
speculate that even though YouTube’s policy puts in lots of effort to
compensate users after an attack is discovered, this practice places
the burden of the risk on the advertisers, who pay to get their ads
displayed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Interactive Advertisement Bureau (IAB) reported that online
advertising generated revenue of $49B in 2014, in the U.S. alone.
This figure corresponds to a 15.6% increase in revenue with respect
to 2013 [1]. Of particular interest to this work is video advertising.
A recent survey indicates that in 2013, 93% of online marketers used
video to advertise their products, and of these, 65% used YouTube
specifically to deliver the content [2]. Online video advertising
is estimated to have generated $3.3B in 2014, in the U.S. alone;
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approximately 7% of the total revenue generated by online advertis-
ing [1]. This figure is estimated to have risen from $2.2B in 2012,
and is expected to grow to $8B by 2016 [1, 3].
Given such revenues, it is no surprise that online advertising
attracts fraud. Recent studies have estimated that 15-30% of ad
impressions to be fraudulent [4, 5], and in some portals this number
may be as high as 75% [7]. This is estimated to lead to losses in the
order of billions of dollars a year for advertisers [8]. With respect
to online video ads, the media and online advertising industry both
report that fraud is endemic [9–11]. The U.S. based marketing
representative body, the Association of National Advertisers (ANA),
reported in 2014 that on average 23% of video ad views across
different studies were fraudulent [12].
In contrast to “click fraud” in search and display advertising
(cf. [13–16]), fraud in online video advertising has received com-
paratively little attention [17]. Typically, the goal of click fraud
is to inflate user activity counters at a particular target, such as a
webpage. Online video ads however offer new motivations, attack
paths, and revenue streams. First, the status and earning from up-
loading popular online videos [18] commonly attracts fraudulent
activity [19], which has triggered online video portals to start au-
diting their systems [20]. For example, it was reported in 2012
that YouTube removed more than 2B suspected “fraudulent” views
from accounts associated with the music industry [21]. Second, in
contrast to search and banner advertising, where advertisers can
collect partial information on their users from clickbacks. Online
videos advertisers must delegate the detection and auditing of fraud
to the portals that host their content, and rely on the high-level statis-
tics they offer. Finally, while search and banner ads are sold at either
Cost-per-Impression (CPI), or Cost-per-Click (CPC), video ads are
typically sold at Cost-per-View (CPV) [22], which are on average
more expensive (sold in sets of 1000, and referred to as Cost Per
Mille (CPM)) [23].
The common attack in online video ad fraud is to inflate the view
counters of videos using botnets [24], or crowd sourced users [25].
In fact, it is easy to find paid services that generate tens of thousands
of views to videos hosted on popular portals (e.g. YouTube, Daily-
motion and Vimeo) at a low price [26–28]. If the goal of the attacker
is simply to increase the popularity and visibility, of their videos,
then this is enough. If however, the goal is to generate revenue, then
the attacker attempts to have ads served to their fake viewers, and
collects a share of the revenue.
In response to the scale of the video-ad fraud, the media and
online advertisers have consistently publicized the need for more ef-
fective anti-fraud solutions [29–32]. The IAB has recently formed a
working group to address the problem [16], and has so far published
a white-paper report on anti-fraud principles, and proposed a refer-
ence taxonomy [25]. Finally, some online video portals have acted
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to forestall damages by strengthening their view auditing systems
and publicizing their activity [33, 34].
Despite these initial steps, today we lack the tools, methods, and
standards to independently understand, audit, and monitor the func-
tion and performance of the fraud detection mechanism deployed by
popular online portals. This is reflected in the IAB working group
white-paper which states that “[Supply sources] are challenged by a
lack of consistent and independently measurable principles on how
they each should identify and expunge fraudulent traffic” [25].
The main contribution of this paper is a novel measurement
methodology to aid in filling this gap. Employing a modular active
probe, we evaluate the performance of the fraud detection mecha-
nism (for public and/or monetized views) of 5 online video portals,
namely YouTube, Dailymotion, Vimeo, Myvideo.de, and TV UOL.
Finding that YouTube is the only portal deploying a sufficiently
discriminative view audit system, we deepen our analysis to study
some of its key parameters. We focus on parameters that are directly
accessible to users, and are reported to be manipulated by video
view-inflation bots in the wild [19, 35, 36].
We study the impact of manipulating the behavior of an IP address,
such as varying the number of videos visited per day, the views per
video, and the duration per view. We then look at the impact of
changing the browser-profile of viewers, such as whether or not
cookies are enabled, and the impact of mixing viewer activity in
NATed traffic.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
(1) Of the 5 portals listed, YouTube is the only portal to deploy a
significantly discriminative view audit system for the public view
counters. All other portals do not sufficiently discount their view
counters, even under the simplest fake views generation configura-
tions.
(2) A deeper analysis reveals that the detection mechanisms of
YouTube’s public view counter are susceptible to simple fake views
generation strategies such as; using multiple values in the HTTP
connection attributes (e.g., User-Agent or Referrer), distributing
views across multiple IP addresses, or routing views through NATs.
(3) We find a consistent and significant discrepancy between the
counter values reported for the same content by the public, and
monetized view counters in YouTube. We find that the monetized
view counters count at least 75% more fake views than public view
counters.
Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. 2 presents the
background on the business models and statistic reporting tools for
the five online video portals considered in this study. In Sec. 3
we present the measurement tools and the performance metrics
used in this study. Sec. 4 evaluates the performance of the view
audit systems of the different online portals. Sec. 5 and Sec. 6
present more detailed analysis of how YouTube’s audit systems
discount the counters for the public and the monetized view counters,
respectively. Finally, Sec. 7 discusses the related work, Sec. 8
discusses the ethical considerations and feedback received from the
industry and Sec. 9 concludes the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
In this work, we focus on user-generated video portals, the most
widely used and, therefore the most susceptible to video advertising
fraud. Table 1 summarizes the online-video market shares of the
portals considered in this study. Since YouTube is reported by all
sources to be the largest portal, it will serve as the reference portal
in our study.
User-generated video portals typically monetize the content up-
loaded by their users through advertising. YouTube, Dailymotion,
Source YouTube Vimeo Dailymotion Myvideo.de TV UOL
SYSOMOS [37] 81.9% 8.8% 4% - -
DATANYZE [38] 65.1% 11.1% 0.6% - -
NIELSEN [39] 84.2% - 1.16% - -
Statista [40] 73.6% 0.9% 1.6% - -
Alexa 3 145 84 3236(DE: 153)
101
(BR: 5)
Views/day
(x1M) [41] 1200 1 60 7 6
Table 1: Market share and rank of the portals studied from different
public sources.
Myvideo.de, TV UOL all deliver ads on the videos streamed to their
viewers. YouTube directly incentivises its users by sharing with
them, the ad revenues generated by views to the videos they upload
and explicitly enroll into its monetization programme. Dailymo-
tion instead incentivises third party web masters, by sharing with
them ad revenue generated from views to videos embedded on their
sites.1 In contrast, Vimeo runs a subscription based model. Users
subscribed to its ‘Plus’ account are able to monetize their uploads
by using the “Tip Jar” service, that enables other viewers to tip to
the uploader. Moreover uploaders subscribed to its ‘Pro’ service
may use a “Pay-To-View” service in which viewers pay to watch.
Finally, while Myvideo.de, and TV UOL show ads in videos, to the
best of our knowledge, they do not share ad revenue with their users.
Under these revenue models, malicious users are incentived to
inflate their view counters because revenue is divided based on view
counts, as in the case of YouTube and Dailymotion. However, as
mentioned the goal of user view inflation is not just limited to de-
frauding revenue from ad systems. There are numerous documented
cases showing that users can, and do trade on just the popularity of
their uploads, cf. [42].
To help their uploaders understand how viewers interact with their
content, video portals report various statistics to them.
YouTube provides two main sources of data on user activity and
counted views; public statistics (public view counter, number of
comments, likes, dislikes, number of subscribers) that are available
on the video page, and private statistics (referred to as YouTube
Analytics) that include the number of counted and monetized views,
and are only available to the video uploader.
YouTube Analytics provides detailed statistics, including; the
number of video views grouped by day, country, viewer age, gen-
der, or the playback location (if video is embedded in third party
websites). Uploaders are also given summary reports on their chan-
nel subscribers, including their likes and dislikes, comments, etc.
Finally, these statistics are updated daily [43], and based on our
experiments, YouTube Analytics counters include only the validated
views.
YouTube provides separate statistics for counters on monetized
content. To monetize their content, uploaders have to first create an
AdSense account, and enroll their YouTube channel. Uploaders can
then view monetization statistics in both their YouTube Analytics
and the AdSense accounts. In this paper we use the monetization
statistics from the YouTube Analytics service, which is claimed to
provide an error of less than± 2% with respect to the actual number
of monetized views [44]. In particular, the monetization statistics
offered by YouTube Analytics are; (i) the estimated number of
monetized views, i.e., the number of views that see an associated
video ad, (ii) the estimated revenue based on the Cost per Mile
(CPM), and (iii) the total gross revenue the video generated. In
1Web masters can embed any video available on Dailymotion in
their website.
order to enable uploaders to better target their contents, these metrics
are available by country, date and type of ad.
Dailymotion provides public view counts on each video page, and
uploaders can access similar statistics to those offered by YouTube
Analytics. For example the number of views filtered by country,
and playback location, over a selected time window. Web masters
registered with the Dailymotion monetization service can access
monetization statistics including the number of impressions, the es-
timated revenue, and CPM. However, these statistics are aggregated
across all videos associated to a web master’s account, and are not
available for individual videos.
Myvideo.de and TV UOL provide public view counters only. This
data can be accessed through the video page and via the uploader
account.
Vimeo offers public statistics for each video including the number of
views, likes, comments, as well as their weekly evolution. Vimeo’s
default account type reports to its users only the public statistics,
whereas the Vimeo ‘Plus’ and ‘Pro’ accounts provide more detailed
statistics [45], including; geographical information about the views,
information about user comments, or likes for the video, etc.
In addition, video portals offer advertisers statistics on the per-
formance of their video ads. For instance, YouTube uses Google
AdWords (Google’s advertising campaigns service) for this purpose.
Among other statistics, Google Adwords provides information about
the number of views charged to advertisers, as well as the videos
where their ads were shown. These statistics are aggregated by day.
Since the statistics reported by portals are typically summaries,
it is difficult for third parties to understand how they are generated.
Therefore, this work helps to address this gap by proposing and
testing view counter auditing tools and methodologies for online
video portals.
3. MEASUREMENT TOOLS, PERFOR-
MANCE ASSESSMENT METHODOL-
OGY AND DATA PROCESSING
In this section we present the methodology and tools developed
to independently evaluate the effectiveness of the view audit mecha-
nisms deployed by the online video portals listed in Table 1.
Given that we are not able to observe all the data collected by
portals on their users, nor the logic of their audit systems, in this
work, we simplify the problem by exploring only parameters and
methods that are directly accessible to third parties (uploaders and
viewers). Specifically, we explore the impact of the viewer behavior
and the viewer IP address space.
3.1 Active Measurement Tools
To study the performance of the view audit systems deployed
by the portals, we deploy active probes that auto generate views,
under well defined constraints, and log the results of their activity.
In addition, we utilize tailored web crawlers to collect the statistics
provided by the different video portals, such as the numbers of
counted and monetized views.
Automatic Views Generation: We implemented a Selenium [46]
based (modular) probe to simulate the actions of viewers on the
different portals. The probe is able to load a given video page,
and can be easily configured to perform certain viewer-like actions,
such as, interacting with the objects in the page, or varying the
duration of video views. The different configurable parameters of
our tool are similar to those of some well-known malware, devoted to
fraudulently viewing YouTube videos, [19, 35, 36] and are therefore
representative of realistic attack configurations observed in the wild.
Parameter Description Default Value
User-Agent Set the User-Agent for a session (e.g., Fire-fox or Chrome). Linux/Firefox
Referrer
Set the referrer for a session. Options are
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube Search (spe-
cific for the case of YouTube), and Direct
Link.
Direct Link
Cookies When enabled, all the views have the samecookies. Disabled
View duration
Duration of a video view (in seconds). Op-
tions are i) fixed time or ii) samples from an
exponentially distributed random variable
with mean the duration of the video.
Fixed (40 secs.)
Wait time be-
tween views
Vary the view inter-arrival time (seconds).
Options are a Poisson process, or a con-
stant. Zero indicates a burst.
Constant factor
of the number of
daily views
Table 2: Description of the software probe parameters and their
default values.
Table 2 summarizes the list of available parameters and their default
settings.
Experiment Isolation: In order to isolate the impact of the ex-
periments on the portals, we limit the maximum number of views
generated by the experiments, and the probes generate views to only
videos that we upload for the experiments. All experiments are
repeated multiple times in order to make the statistics robust. To
reduce the impact of background noise, such as real users stumbling
upon the videos, we set the names and descriptions of all experiment
videos to random hashes, and all external links to them are removed.
To get a baseline for the effectiveness of the method, we measure
the scale of the background noise of our approach by uploading 209
videos to YouTube, which we find attract only 21 views in total from
external users in a three month test period.
To conduct the experiments, we use ∼100 public IP addresses lo-
cated in two different /24 prefixes in Spain and Germany. Moreover,
we install transparent proxies (Squid [47]) in 300 PlanetLab nodes
PlanetLab nodes [48] and use 70 of them in the experiments. The
proxies relay views generated by probes coordinated from a central-
ized controller. Finally, through experimenting we determine that
YouTube treats direct and transparently proxied requests equally.
Fetching Statistics from Video Portals: To retrieve the statistics
reported by each portal, we deploy portal-tailored web crawlers.
These enable us to: (i) collect the information from the video public
view counters, (ii) login to the uploader account and retrieve the
number of counted views for the video, as well as the number of
monetized views (if available).2 In particular, for Myvideo.de, TV
UOL, and Vimeo, we retrieve information on the number of counted
views, whereas for YouTube and Dailymotion we also retrieve the
reported statistics for the number of monetized views.
3.2 Performance Analysis
To measure the performance of the different portal view audit
systems and compare them, we analyze their classification accuracy.
We measure their accuracy in detecting fake views, and report the
false negative rates. For some specific portals we also report their
false positive rates.
False negative rate: a false negative is a ‘fake view’ that is mis-
classified and counted in the view counter (public or monetized). To
measure the false negative ratio of a portal, a probe generates views
to given videos and retrieves the number of counted views from the
statistics offered by the portal. The false negative rate (RFN ) for
the given platform is defined as:
2In the case of Dailymotion, the crawler can also login in the web
master account.
Trace Period Length # IP addresses # Views # Videos
YT-1 01/03/13-30/04/13 2 months 28071 3.94M 1.37M
YT-2 01/05/13-30/11/13 7 months 16781 15.9M 3.95M
Table 3: Summary statistics of measurement traces containing
YouTube video sessions.
RFN =
# counted views
# ‘probe’ generated views
False positive rate: a false positive is defined as a ‘real user’ view
that is labeled as fake by the view audit systems, and not counted in
the view counters. To measure the false positive ratio of a portal, we
crowd-source real users to view experiment videos on the portals,
and then retrieve the view statistics from the portal. To accurately
count user views, we first embed the videos into webpages that we
can monitor, and then count only views via the webpage. The false
positive rate (RFP ) for the given platform is then defined as:
RFP = 1− # counted views# ‘real-user’ generated views
Data Processing: In carrying out these experiments, we found that
the view audit systems of some video portals displayed temporally
transient behaviors. In particular, we observed that some exper-
iments showed peaks in the false negative ratio on a unique day.
Moreover, YouTube would count more views in the first few days
of the experiment, then later adjust to a lower stable false negative
ratio for the rest of the experiment. Therefore, in order to identify
the standard behavior of view audit systems of video portals, and
remove the impact of transients, we compute for each experiment
the daily false negative ratio and calculate the median across the
days of the experiment. For simplicity, we refer to this metric as
RFN in the rest of the paper. Finally, we take care of repeating all
experiments numerous times to provide statistical confidence and
report average, min and max RFN across experiments.
4. VIEW FRAUD DETECTION IN ONLINE
VIDEO PORTALS
In this section, we investigate how views are counted by the
different portals listed in Table 1. We first compare how the portals
penalize views in their public view counters. We then look at how
YouTube and Dailymotion, which share revenue with their users,
penalize view counters for monetized content.
4.1 The Accuracy of public view counters
Rate of False Negatives: We start by looking at the rate of false
negatives for public view counters. To do so, we set up a simple
experiment whereby each probe, with default parameters, from a
fixed IP address, varies only the number of views it generates per
day, to a given video, on a given portal. In particular, for each portal,
we generate 100, 400 and 500 views per day, which corresponds
to view inter-arrival times of 864, 216, and 172 sec., to targeted
videos. Each experiment runs for eight days and is repeated three
times using IP addresses from our prefixes in Germany and Spain.
To understand whether the number of views that we generate cor-
responds to normal user behavior, we collect traces from a residential
ISP, and log the YouTube sessions. We replicate the methodology
described in [49], and collect two independent datasets (from the
residential network of an ISP) that contain millions of YouTube
sessions. We refer to these datasets as YT-1 and YT-2 and we sum-
marize their main characteristics in Table 3. Our traces indicate that
no single IP addresses in YT-1 and YT-2 performs more than 100
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Figure 1: Comparison of the false negative ratio of the public view
counter of the studied portals for different daily view rates.
views per day to a single video.3 Therefore these configurations
(100, 400, 500 views per day) should correspond to an ‘aggressive’
probe behavior, and we expect them to be detected easily.
The results of this experiment are reported in Figure 1. The
main bars report the average rate of false negatives for the three
experiments, while the error bars report the max and min RFN . The
different colors correspond to the different daily view rates.
Our results indicate that YouTube, which penalizes all the views
from the probes, operates the most discriminative view auditing
system, and is significantly more effective than the other portals.
In contrast, Dailymotion counts as valid almost all the views when
the daily rate is 100, and 93% (85%) when the rate is 400 (500)
views per day. Myvideo.de, TV UOL and Vimeo deploy view audit
systems that detect < 5% of the probe’s fake views, even for the
most aggressive configuration.
In summary, we observe that YouTube implements the most dis-
criminative view audit system, and is able to easily detect ‘obviously’
aggressive behaviors. Surprisingly, the systems deployed by all the
other portals appear to be almost completely ineffective.
Rate of False Positives: To evaluate the rate of false positives,
we embed videos hosted in the different portals into webpages
we control, and record the number of real users accessing each
page and watching each video, and the duration of each view. We
compare the impact of sourcing users via social media and an online
crowdsourcing platform.
In the case of social media, we recruit volunteers viewers by
advertising for the experiment URLs on Facebook and Twitter. In
the case of the crowdsourced users, we use a crowdsourcing platform
to recruit paid viewers. Finally, since the results in Figure 1 indicate
that only YouTube and Dailymotion are significantly discriminative
in updating public view counters, we evaluate the rate of false
positives only for these two portals.
The resulting false positive rates of the experiments are summa-
rized in Table 4. We find that the RFP is reasonably small for the
two portals under both user sourcing approaches (< 12%). From
this, we conclude that the view audit systems of YouTube and Dai-
lymotion are fairly effective at identifying views generated by real
users. However, we note that Dailymotion shows a larger RFP for
the first experiment.
Finally, it is worth noting that the data provided by YouTube
and Dailymotion in both experiments shows a spatially localized
distribution of viewer visits. For the social media experiment, most
of the views come from Spain, whereas, for the experiment that uses
crowdsourcing, most of the views come from India and Bangladesh.
3Since YouTube is the most popular among the portals studied, we
assume that the configured number of views per day represents an
aggressive setup for all the portals.
Platform Experiment # performedreal views
# counted
views RFP
YouTube Social Media 330 322 2,4%Crowdsourcing 599 537 10,3%
Dailymotion Social Media 325 290 10.9%Crowdsourcing 587 515 12.2%
Table 4: False positive ratio for the social media and crowdsourced
experiments for YouTube and Dailymotion.
4.2 Counting views in monetized view coun-
ters
Having established a baseline for the penalization of views in
public view counters, with i) obviously aggressive fake view pat-
terns, and ii) real viewers, we now look at the penalization in view
counters for monetized content.
For the following set of experiments, we study the performance
of audit system for monetized views of YouTube and Dailymotion.
These services monetize views by serving ads to viewers and sharing
revenue with their uploaders/web masters. We consider a view from
the probe as monetized, iff a video ad is served to it, and the probe
views the whole ad and the video. We therefore count only views
that we generate, and are served an ad. Then, using the reporting
tools provided by each portal, we compare the number of monetized
views generated by the probe and the numbers reported by the
portals.
To conduct monetization experiments, we register several ac-
counts and their associated videos in the monetization program of
each portal. Since Dailymotion only monetizes videos embedded
in external webpages, we create external webpages to embed the
videos. The web master accounts for these pages are then associated
with uploader accounts. To monetize content on YouTube, uploaders
must register their channels to AdSense, Google’s monetization plat-
form, and indicate which videos to enroll. While for Dailymotion,
the probes direct their views to the external webpages we create for
experiments, for YouTube, we direct views to the YouTube URLs
for the experiment videos.
We have developed several techniques to identify whether ads
are really served in a probe’s views. For YouTube, we analyze the
packet data of the view session, and identify ads by deciphering the
ad serving protocol. While for Dailymotion, we have developed an
image analysis tool, that analyzes snapshots of the view sessions,
and looks for indicative signs that an ad is being served, such as
the text box used to indicate the remaining time for an ad to finish
playing.
Finally, we run these experiments using the default values for the
probe parameters given in Table 2, with the number of views per
video, per day set to 20, and using a single IP address per probe
(from the pool of IPs in Spain and Germany). Each experiment lasts
for 20 days on each portal and is repeated four times.
From the traces we know that less than 0.04%(YT-1), and 0.01%
(YT-2) of IPs in the traces performed more than 20 views per day to
a single video. We therefore consider our experiment configuration
to be aggressive, and the fake views easy to identify. Moreover,
as monetized fake views translate to direct costs to advertisers, we
expect both portals to be stricter in the identification of fraudulent
views for monetized content.
To evaluate the monetized view auditing systems deployed by
YouTube and Dailymotion, we report their respective false negative
rates (RFN ) in Figure 2. We compare the RFN in the number of
views reported by public and monetized view counters. Again, the
main bar depicts the average value across the experiments, and the
error bars give the min-max value of the RFN across the experi-
ments.
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Figure 2: Comparison of false negative ratio for the number of
views in the public and monetized view counters for YouTube and
Dailymotion.
Dailymotion shows the expected behavior, and discounts a larger
number of fake views from the monetization view counter (avg.
RFN = 72%) with respect to the public view counter (avg. RFN =
97%). Despite this improvement, the view audit system for mone-
tized views still performs poorly and roughly 3 out of 4 fake views
are monetized, even under the aggressive configuration of the ex-
periment. Surprisingly, YouTube results are in contradiction with
our expectations. We observe that YouTube’s view auditing system
is more permissive for monetized views (avg. RFN = 82%), when
compared to public view counter (avg. RFN = 7%).
This unexpected result has been reported previously by YouTube
users.4 YouTube support stated that discrepancies may be due to
users watching the video ad, but not the video, and in that case, a
view is monetized but not counted by the public counter. However,
since we instruct the probes to view both the ad and the video in
full, this does not hold in our case.
Another possible source of the discrepancy may be due to
YouTube performing post hoc, rather than real time auditing5 to
identify suspicious activity [50]. However, more than 11 months
have passed since the conclusion of these experiments, and we have
not observed any changes in the statistics reported.
In summary, we find that among the online video portals studied,
only YouTube deploys a sufficiently discriminative video view au-
diting system. However, we observe that YouTube appears to only
penalize views for the public view counter. Having observed that
YouTube deploys the most discriminative view auditing system, in
the rest of the paper, we extend the analysis to help understand some
of the variables that it considers, for public (Sec. 5) and monetized
(Sec. 6) view counters.
5. YOUTUBE’S AUDIT SYSTEM FOR
PUBLIC VIEW COUNTER
In this section, we explore some of the different variables that
are considered by the view auditing system deployed at YouTube.
Because we have adopted a black box method to testing, we focus
on meaningful parameters that are easily accessible to fraudsters.
As indicated earlier, bots executing attacks on YouTube manipulate
a similar set of parameters [19, 35, 36]. Note that in the remainder
of the paper, unless otherwise stated, all described experiments are
repeated 3 times using different IP addresses from our /24 IP prefixes
in Spain and Germany, to detect potential geographical biases in the
measurements.
5.1 Parameters used in the detection
4see https://plus.google.com/100368302890592068600/posts/
1sEuu94EjuV
5Post hoc auditing may be preferred since this approach obstructs
reverse engineering efforts by fraudsters in comparison to real time
detection.
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Figure 3: False negative rate obtained for each
of the experiment configurations.
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pending on the number of views per day.
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Figure 5: Number of views counted by
YouTube for both IP-1 (conservative probe)
and IP-2 (conservative and aggressive probe).
In order to explore the parameter space, and isolate their impact in
the audit system, we configure the probes to run individual behaviors
(configurations of the parameters listed in Table 2).
In the following, each probe instance uses a single public IP
address chosen from the pool, and performs 20 views per day, to
the same video for 8 consecutive days, and repeats this 5 times
to evaluate the rate of false negative (RFN ), i.e., the ratio of fake
views misclassified as valid and counted. Based on the results in
Section 4.2, we expect that the probe behaviours are flagged as
suspicious, and trigger the view audit system of YouTube.
Next, we describe the probe behaviors we use in the experiments.
Note that unless specified, we set all parameters to the default values
given in Table 2.
- Deterministic (D): The goal of this behavior is to define a sim-
ple, and completely deterministic pattern of views. This behavior
eliminates any randomness by setting to constant values the view
time (40 secs.) and the time between views (72 mins.). All other
parameters take their default values from Table 2. We expect this
behavior to be easily identified.
- Vary view burst (B): The goal of this behavior is to study the
impact of making views in bursts. In particular, the probes run the
Deterministic behavior, setting the time between consecutive views
to 0, and generating a burst of N = 20 consecutive views every day.
The time between consecutive bursts can be configured, and is set
to 24 hours in the experiments. Since bursts of views from a given
IP address, to a single video are atypical for users in YT-1 and YT-2,
we expect this behavior to be easily identified, and to have low false
negative ratio.
- Vary inter-view wait time (P): The goal of this behavior is to mea-
sure the impact of varying the time between views over a day. The
probe runs the Deterministic behavior, but varies the time between
two consecutive views. With this behavior, we aim to determine
whether adding some noise to the inter-arrival pattern of views
has any impact when compared to a deterministic pattern In the
following, we use a Poisson with λ = 20.
- Short Views (SV): The goal of this behavior is to measure the
impact of making very short views to videos. In the following, the
probe runs the Deterministic behavior, but sets the duration of video
views to 1 sec. Since consecutive short views are atypical for real
users, we expect to see this behavior will be heavily penalized.
- Cookies (CK): The goal of this behavior is to measure to what
extent audit systems rely on user identifiers when auditing views.
We use cookies since they are the most commonly used method to
track users [51]. We consider the extreme case in which the probe
uses the Deterministic behavior, and performs all views using the
same cookie.
- Complete (C): The goal of this behavior is provide a baseline
by emulating some real-user like features. Therefore we enable
all the parameters in Table 2, except the cookies. Specifically, the
view duration time and wait time between views are set to Poisson
processes with λ = duration of the targeted video, and λ = 72min,
respectively. Finally, the Referrer and User-Agent fields are selected
randomly. Given the variation in the parameters, we expect this
behavior to be the least penalized.
For each behavior, Figure 3 gives the average and max/min RFN .
As expected, the Complete behavior yields the highest false posi-
tive rate (≈40%), and is on average 4x larger with respect to the
other behaviors (RFN < 10%). This indicates that adding some
randomness to basic HTTP parameters such as the User-Agent, or
the Referrer makes it significantly harder for YouTube to detect fake
views.
Looking at the impact of varying the wait time between views (P,
D and B), we observe that the view audit system penalizes Bursty
behavior the most heavily, discounting 98% of the views. Compar-
ing the Deterministic and the Short Views behaviors, contrary to
our expectation, they are both similarly penalized. We observe that
the audit system counts as valid 7% and 6% of views for the D and
SV configurations respectively . Finally, we observe no significant
change to enabling/disabling user tracking via the cookies. The
differences in false negative ratios with cookies(CK) and without
(D, SV, etc.) cookies are negligible.
In summary, we find that YouTube is able to identify the simplest
suspicious behavior patterns, schemes using static HTTP connec-
tion parameters are easily identified. Indeed, the view audit system
is able to remove more than 90% of fake views generated under
these attack configurations. We observe however that adding some
variability to HTTP connection parameters may increase the effec-
tiveness of attacks up to∼30%. While these results explain the false
negative rate difference between the considered configurations and
the benchmark, they do not explain the significant number (60%)
of discounted fake views common to all the configurations. The
only variable common to all the configurations, and which may be
responsible for such large a penalization is that they each perform
their views from a unique public IP address. This along with the
fact that IP addresses are one of the strongest online users iden-
tifiers [50], and one of the key parameters many security online
services use [14, 52, 53] leads us to believe that the video viewing
pattern from an IP address is a key element for the fake view detec-
tion mechanism of YouTube. We analyze this hypothesis in the next
subsection.
5.2 Influence of Video Viewing Pattern in the
detection
In this subsection we analyze the response of YouTube’s view
audit systems to the fake view patterns of an IP address. We first
look at the impact of view patterns to a single video, then explore
the cases for a single IP viewing multiple videos, and finally a single
video receiving views from multiple IP addresses.
One video, One IP address
We start by examining how YouTube discounts the views generated
by a single IP address to a single video. In particular, we are
interested in understanding how the view penalization threshold(s)
are triggered, when varying the number of views per day. We
conduct a simple experiment, in which the probe generates W =
[1, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60] views per day, to a given video,
for 8 days. We use the previously defined Deterministic behavior
for this experiment.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 4, which re-
ports the RFN for the different numbers of views (W ). We observe
that the view audit system counts all the views up to a rate of 8 per
day. From 9 views on, the RFN decays exponentially and is 0 for
more than 30 views per day. We observe that the RFN with respect
to the views per day (W ) follows an exponential decay function,
and can be modeled with the following parameters, with an R2 =
0.999:
RFN (W ) =
{
1 if W ≤ 8,
e−0.455n otherwise
For the previous experiments, we used newly uploaded videos. To
understand whether this has any impact on the results obtained, we
look at the response of the audit system when we generate views for
videos previously uploaded to YouTube and are moderately popular,
and repeat the experiment. With the permission of the uploaders, we
use two videos with roughly 12K (100 in the last month) and 300K
(5K in the last month) registered views at the start of the experiment.
To identify the activity of the probe in the results, we configure it
to use very rare User-Agents (Bada, HitTop, MeeGo and Nintendo
3DS). Before starting the experiment, we validate that the targeted
videos have not received any views from the selected User-Agents
in the previous 6 months using YouTube Analytics.
Setting W = [8, 9, 10, 20] views per day, we find that the view
audit system again starts discounting views from 8 views per day,
for a given IP address, and RFN follows the same decay pattern.
This suggests that view audit system of YouTube are triggered by a
fixed threshold regardless of a video’s popularity.
Multiple videos, One IP address
Having observed how the views from a single IP address to a single
video are penalized, we now look at the response of the view audit
system when a single IP address spreads its views over several
videos. Given the previous result, we expect that aggressive IP
addresses will be heavily penalized, independent of the number of
videos they target.
In the following, we first test this hypothesis, and then present the
results of a large scale measurements to understand how the rate of
false negative varies with respect to the number of videos viewed,
and views performed, per IP address.
To begin to understand how the view audit system differentiates
between IP addresses, we define two simple probe behaviors; con-
servative and aggressive. The conservative probe performs 1 view
per day, while the aggressive probe performs 30 views per day. We
set up the following experiment: in two IP addresses, IP-1 and IP-2,
we launch an instance of the conservative probe to a different video
for 34 days. Moreover, in IP-2, we also launch an instance of the
aggressive probe, starting at day 8 and stopping at day 24, while
there is no aggressive probe in IP-1.
Figure 5 gives the number of views the audit system counts over
time, for the conservative probes in the two IP addresses. Since
conservative probes perform just 1 view per day, to the video, we
expect to see either; 1, if it is counted, or 0, if it is penalized. We
find that the audit system counts all the views from the conservative
probe in IP-1, and penalizes the conservative probe in IP-2 for the
days that the aggressive probe is also running from IP-2 (days 9-26).
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Figure 6: RFN for several combinations of the number of views W
and the number of watched videos D.
We observe that view penalization starts 24 hours after the launch
of the aggressive probe in IP-2, and ends two days after the probe
stops. Repeating the experiment three times in total, we obtain the
same results. From this, we conclude that YouTube’s fake view
audit system labels and tracks the behavior of IP addresses based on
their global view behavior across all videos that they visit.
Having observed that YouTube’s view audit system labels IP
addresses based on their behavior, we now look at how it penal-
izes the behavior of an IP address across video views. To do
so, we conduct a large scale experiment in which we perform
W = [1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20] views per day, uniformly distributed
across D = [1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20] videos (with W ≥ D), over a
period of 7 days.6 In total, we ran 28 combinations of views and
videos. Finally, we use the Deterministic behavior for the probe.
Figure 6 reports the RFN across the 28 combinations considered.
Looking at the evolution of RFN for a fixed number of videos, we
observe the exponential decay revealed in Figure 4. However, in this
case, view penalization is triggered after 15 views per day, when a
viewer watches 3 or more distinct videos per day (D ≥ 3), whereas
in Figure 4 it was triggered after 8 views per day (for D = 1). With
respect to the evolution of RFN for a fixed number of daily views,
we observe that when all views are to a single video, the penalization
is much more severe, than when they spread across three or more
videos.
One video, Multiple IP addresses
Having established, that an IP address is tracked across video views,
we now look at the response of the view audit system, when the
views to a given video are distributed across several IP addresses.
To this end, we use 70 different PlanetLab proxies, and divide them
in 3 independent groups of different size N = [10, 20, 40]. We
assign each group of proxies a different video on YouTube, and
configure each proxy to generate views to its corresponding video.
We again utilize the Deterministic behavior of the probe, and report
the results with each PlanetLab proxy group to generate 3 views per
day. Overall, the experiment generates 30, 60 and 120 views per
day to a video, which should result in RFN = 0, if coming from a
single IP address.
From this experiment, we observe that the growth in number of
views over time is linear for all behaviors, and that overall RFN >
73% in all three experiments. This indicates that distributing activity
across multiple IP addresses results in a substantial increase in the
RFN enabling attackers to inflate view counters easily.
This experiment suggests that YouTube is vulnerable to attacks
that employ many IP addresses (such as those from botnets), and
such attacks can apparently achieve an arbitrarily large number of
views. In fact, it is easy to find paid services that offer to inflate the
view counter of YouTube (and other video platforms) videos up to
6Note that we only run experiments for W ≥ D. For instance, in
the case of W = 5 we run experiments for D = 1, 3, 5.
Experiment W (views/day) # U (usersbehind the NAT) U/W RFN
Loc. 1 20 ∼50 ∼ 2.5 0.9
Loc. 2 75 ∼100 ∼ 1.33 0.43
Loc. 3 100 ∼50 ∼ 0.5 0.36
Table 5: RFN and information about the three scenarios for the
experiments we conduct from NATed IP addresses.
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Figure 7: Distribution of daily RFN for working days and days off
for Location 2.
tens of thousand views in a short period of time and at a low price
(e.g. [26–28]).
5.3 Impact of NATed IP addresses on the au-
dit system
As NAT devices aggregate traffic, they typically contain the video
viewing activity from multiple, usually private, IP addresses. In large
NATed networks, such as campus networks, corporate networks,
and in some cases ISP networks, this activity may be significantly
large.
Therefore, in the following set of experiments, we investigate how
the view audit system of YouTube penalizes the views originating
from NATed networks. To do so, we install the probes on three
machines accessing the Internet from NATed networks located at
three different locations, and we configure them to perform 20
(Location 1), 75 (Location 2), and 100 (Location 3) views per day
for a period of 8 days. We again use the Deterministic behavior.
Table 5 reports the RFN for each experiment along with infor-
mation of the different NATed scenarios. Note that, although the
probe generates views aggressively, the RFN is surprisingly large
in all cases. This suggests that the YouTube’s view audit system has
problems in properly identifying suspicious activity from NATed net-
works. To confirm this finding, we separately analyze the RFN on
working days and days off (i.e., weekends and holidays) in Location
2, and run the experiment for 194 days. Note, during working days
the volume of NATed traffic from the network is high, whereas it is
low during the days off. Figure 7 shows the distribution of the daily
false negative rate for working days and days off in the boxplots.
The results confirm that YouTube discounts almost all views during
days off, i.e., when the traffic is more exposed, but has problems in
discount views (median RFN = 60%) for workdays, i.e., when the
views are hidden by larger volumes of traffic. Hence, this suggests
that malicious users can dramatically increase the efficiency of their
activity by gaining access to machines located behind large (active)
NATed networks, e.g., a public campus network.
5.4 Punishment of IP prefixes
Our analysis so far shows that an IP address is punished by its
global behavior. In this subsection, we go one step further to analyze
whether YouTube’s fake view detection algorithm punishes ranges of
IP addresses when one of them is misbehaving. Note that punishing
IP prefixes due to the misbehavior of a single IP address is a common
technique that, for instance, we have experienced when querying
BitTorrent trackers in previous studies [54]. In addition, some
existing solutions propose to consider IP address within the same
prefixes as it has been observed that botnet-infected machines choose
as potential future members of the botnet machines within the same
IP prefix [52].
We perform a similar experiment to the one described in Sec-
tion 5.2. We start an instance from IP address IP-A that behaves
properly and makes 1 daily view to a video. After a few days, we
start a second instance from IP address IP-B, which misbehaves
and performs 20 daily views to a second video. Note that IP-A and
IP-B belong to the same /X prefix. We conduct this experiment
for values of X ranging between 24 and 30 and we did not observe
any punishment. Therefore, we conclude that YouTube detection
mechanism does not punish consecutive IP addresses belonging to
the same /24 onward.
5.5 Detection Time
The results of Figure 5, as well as those of other experiments,
indicate that the punishment does not start right after the IP address
begins to misbehave. This suggests that YouTube’s fake views de-
tection mechanism requires some time before it starts punishing a
misbehaving IP address. Our aim in this subsection is to quantify
this “detection time” with respect to the past history of an IP address.
In particular, we consider three types of IP addresses based on their
history: (i) a fully-clean IP address that we have never used to
connect to YouTube, (ii) an IP address that we have used before to
watch YouTube videos but has never shown a misbehaving watching
pattern; and (iii) an IP address that has shown a misbehaving watch-
ing pattern in the past. For each one of these IP addresses, we start
7 instances of our software performing W = 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20 and
25 views per day, respectively. This aggressive behavior guarantees
that the fake view detection system will mark the IP addresses as
suspicious and will discount their views. Our results show that the
system punishes the fully-clean IP address after 12 days, whereas
it starts punishing the other two IP addresses one day after the ex-
periment starts. Therefore, it seems that YouTube monitors and
logs any IP address that connects to the system, and as soon as
an already logged IP address misbehaves, the YouTube detection
mechanism start discounting its views just after one day. However,
for IP addresses which are unknown to the system, the detection
mechanism is much more conservative and does not discounts their
views until some days have passed.
In summary, the view audit system of YouTube implements an
exponential discount factor of the number of views performed from a
single IP address that increases with the rate of views. However, the
results show that some simple modifications in a fraudster’s strategy
can considerably increase the false negative rate. In practice, i)
adding some randomness in the HTTP connection attributes such as
the User-Agent or the Referrer, ii) distributing the malicious activity
across multiple IP addresses, or iii) performing fake views from
NATed networks, are shown to be effective.
6. YOUTUBE’S AUDIT SYSTEM FOR
MONETIZED VIEWS
Surprisingly, the results in Section 4 indicate that YouTube mon-
etizes (almost) all the fake views we generate, while discounting
them from the public view counters. In this section we study in
more detail the audit mechanism applied to monetized views, to
further understand this seemingly anomalous behavior.
We reuse the configuration described in Section 4.2 for YouTube,
and conduct a new set of experiments, whereby we increment
the number of views per day the probe generates from a sin-
gle IP address, to a single video. In particular, we set W =
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Figure 8: Comparison of false negative ratio for the public and
monetized view counters of YouTube for different daily rates of
generated views W .
[40, 60, 80, 100, 150] to cover a wide range of aggressive configura-
tions. We conduct each experiment for 10 days. Figure 8 reports the
RFN for both the public and the monetized view counters. Again,
the main bars and error bars represent the average and the max/min
RFN , respectively.
We find that the monetized view counter’s audit system penalizes
a negligible portion of views in all the considered configurations,
while the public view counter’s audit system penalizes most of the
fake views. These results confirm the preliminary observation in
Section 4; YouTube applies different penalization schemes to the
fake views in the monetized and public view counter, with the former
being much more permissive than the latter.
6.1 Counting monetized views from the ad-
vertiser’s perspective
To gain insight into the monetary implications of the above find-
ing, we designed a tailored experiment in which we assume the
role of an advertiser exposed to fraudulent views. To do so, we
first create an advertiser account using the Google AdWords service.
AdWords enables us to configure advertising campaigns in YouTube,
so that our video ads can target YouTube videos whose uploaders
participate in the monetization programme. We then create a video
ad and build an advertising campaign to target experiment videos
that we have previously uploaded to YouTube. In this way, we play
both the role of the advertiser and the publisher in the campaigns,
and can build a complete picture of the trade.
AdWords offers a wide range of tools to aid in the design of
video advertising campaigns. Advertisers can tailor campaigns to
reach specific YouTube viewer demographics (per interests, country,
language, gender, age), or target specific YouTube videos. With the
aim of checking if YouTube actually charges advertisers in presence
of fake views, we configure a campaign to target the views from
the countries where the proxies are located (accepting all languages,
genders and ages) and headed to the experiment videos. Then, we
use the probe to generate views to these videos.
YouTube deploys a sophisticated bidding algorithm that selects in
real time the ad to target to a specific video. Briefly, this algorithms
implements a variant of a Vickrey auction, named Generalized
Second-Price auction [55] for which the winner (advertiser) pays
the price of the second highest bid. Note that winning bids vary over
time and targeted videos. In addition to the bid price, the algorithm
also considers other parameters including the profile of the viewer
watching the video, the advertiser’s daily budget, etc.
In setting up these experiments, we faced several challenges
to configure a successful campaign able to target a large number
of ad views in the videos. Our initial trails were unsuccessful;
we used a small daily budget of 50e and the campaign had an
unusual configuration, since it targeted very specific and relatively
unpopular videos. To overcome this, we took advice from an online
advertising expert to; i) increase the bidding prices per ad view up to
10-15e (the recommended bid price for YouTube was 0.04-0.05e),
ii) configure the video uploader’s AdSense account to accept only
the specific type of ads defined in the campaign, iii) configure
different campaigns with different accounts that compete for the
same videos (viewers), iv) to vary the pattern of views to the videos.
Having done so, we launched new experiments, whereby we
targeted a set of videos from different IP addresses and different
rates of views per IP address (between 10 and 70 views per IP
address). In particular, the campaigns targeted 14 videos, using the
Deterministic configuration of the probe. Of the 14 trails, 5 videos
were able to attract ad views from the campaigns, meaning that we
bid and won - in effect the ads were targeted to the uploaded videos,
and watched by the probes, which are configured to view in full any
ad target, as well as the video.
Table 6 summarizes the main characteristics of the view pattern
configuration of these videos. Moreover, it shows the number of
monetized ad views from the campaigns, as well as the number
of counted views in the public view counter for the days of the
experiment in which our ad was delivered. We observe that in all the
cases the number of monetized views are larger than the number of
counted views, i.e., views considered suspicious are removed from
the public view counter, but monetized.
Our videos received a total of 301 ad views in 5 days.7 In the
case of Video 3 and 4, views were initially added to the bill of
our advertiser account. However, 5 days after the first ad view
was delivered, YouTube rightfully labeled the probe’s activity as
suspicious and suspended the video uploader account in AdSense.
In addition, YouTube notified us via email of the suspension of
the uploader’s account due to suspicious activity . Finally, the ad
views associated to fake views were removed from the advertiser
account and 4.85e refunded. We believe that the peculiar setup of
the campaign, coupled with the aggressiveness of the experiment
triggered alarms in YouTube’s view audit system. In case of Video
4, we repeated this experiment twice obtaining the same result
(AdSense account closed).
In the case of Video 1 and 2, 91 ad views were shown, for which
we were charged 5.65e, whereas just 25 views were counted in
the public view counter. Google indicates through its AdWords
support website that "If we find invalid clicks that have somehow
escaped the automated detection in the past two months, we’ll give
you credit for these clicks" [56]. In the case of Video 1 and 2, all the
ad views were made more than 8 months before the conclusion of
this work. Therefore we can consider that the probe’s actions have
gone unnoticed by Google’s fraud detection algorithm.
In summary, we conclude that YouTube uses a seemingly per-
missive view audit system to discount fake monetized views. This
exposes advertisers to the risk of building their advertisement cam-
paigns on unreliable statistics, and may make them initially burden
the risk of fraud. Conversely, the public view counter is much more
discriminative, demonstrating that YouTube has effective means to
identify fake views. Our results also reveal that whenever the permis-
sive threshold for the detection of fake monetized views is crossed,
YouTube severely penalizes the uploader of the video by suspending
her AdSense account, preventing the uploader from monetizing any
of the videos associated to the suspended account.
7. RELATED WORK
7 Note that after finishing the experiments, these videos have re-
ceived only 16 views in 8 months. Based on this, we have high
certainty that our video ad was only viewed by the probes, and not
by legitimate users.
# IPs Daily Viewsper IP
Monetized view
counter
Public view
counter
Video 1 1 10 31 18
Video 2 1 20 60 7
Video 3 8 10 178 147
Video 4 2 70 15 (17) 0
Table 6: Experiments configuration of videos attracting ads from
our advertising campaigns. The reported numbers of monetized and
public counted views correspond to the sum of views of the days
in which ads were shown. The number 17 for Video 4, reflects the
second trail of the experiment.
The research community has devoted an important amount of
effort to the identification of malicious behaviors in online services
and to the design of countermeasures to such behaviors [57–59].
Similarly to YouTube’s fake view detection mechanism, most of
the detection system designs rely on the IP address as the main id
to track and identify malicious behaviors. Some examples of such
mechanisms are the classical monitoring tools looking for sources
of attacks, such as port scanning [60] and DDoS attacks [61], or the
detection systems which counteract malicious users in P2P appli-
cations [62]. Only those systems requiring the user registration to
gain access to the service, e.g., Online Social Networks, implement
detection mechanisms that use both the IP address and the user id as
basic units to detect inappropriate behaviors. For instance, Facebook
traces the requests pattern from a given account, if it is unusual, the
user is warned and if the behavior persists the account is closed [63].
More recently, the rapid proliferation of botnets and specialized
bots to attack specific services has led the research community
to work on the identification, characterization and elimination of
botnets and bots [64–72]. Additionally, following a similar method-
ology to the one we use in this paper, Boshmaf et al. [73] and Bilge
et al. [74] have developed their own automatic software to evaluate
the effectiveness of the defenses of different social networks from
different types of attacks such as user impersonation.
In the field of fraud detection and mitigation in online advertising,
most of the literature focuses on traditional type of ads such as search
or display ads. In this case, the fraud problem is referred to as “click
fraud” since the fraudulent activity is associated to fake clicks on
ads, typically performed from bots. Metwally et al. [14] present
an early study in which they use the IP address as the parameter to
detect coalition of fraudulent users or fraudsters. In a more recent
work, Li et al. [75] propose to analyze the paths of ad’s redirects and
the nodes found in the content delivery path to identify malicious
advertising activities. Furthermore, Stone-Gross et al. [15] managed
to get access to a command-and-control botnet used for ad fraud
in which the bot master sends commands with fake referrers. On
a complementary work, Miller et al. [76] study the behavior of
two clicking robots: Fiesta and 7cy. Fiesta uses a middleman that
probably shares its revenue with advertiser sub-syndicates. 7cy
tries to emulate a human behavior and presents different behaviors
depending on the location of the infected computer. Moreover,
Dave et al. [77] design an algorithm to identify click fraud from the
advertiser perspective; to design this algorithm, the authors propose
to measure different aspects of the user behavior in the advertiser
webpage such as the mouse movements or the time spent in the
website. Based on their initial work, the same authors propose,
implement and test ViceROI [13], a solution to discount fake clicks
from ad networks. The basis of ViceROI detection algorithm is
the fact that click-spammers will lead to a higher ROI (Return of
Investment) than a legitimate publisher, as the authors claim that
a realistic ROI is difficult to obtain with robots. Fraudsters can
perform other types of attacks in the online advertisment ecosystem.
For example, Snyder et al. [78] present a study of the prevalence
of fraud in affiliate marketing networks. These networks encourage
publishers to promote online shops on their webpages, receiving
later some amount of money if the user, that has clicked in the
promoted link, makes a purchase in that online shop. Fraudsters
setup a webpage forcing user’s browser to click the promoted link.
Later if that user buys an item in the promoted online shop, the
fraudster will receive credit for it. Another example is presented
by Thomas et al. [79]. They study the impact of ad injection in the
advertisement ecosystem. They identify mainly Chrome extensions
and Windows binaries responsible of this source of fraud. Finally,
Meng et al. [80] present a new type of attack taking advantage of the
different prices paid depending on the user’s profile. They claimed
that fraudsters could increase their revenue as much as 33% by
“polluting” user’s profiles with high paying preferences.
All the above works establish a very solid basis for the design
of tools to mitigate fraud associated to traditional ads. However,
they are (in general) not applicable to fraud associated to video ads
due to the different nature of video ads and click-based ads. To
the best of the authors knowledge, there is only a very recent study
that analyzes fraud in video ads [17]. The authors of this study
use traces from a video platform in China to identify statistically
outlying video viewing patterns and, based on these observations,
suggest a fake view detection algorithm built on parameters such
as the number of views made from an IP address to a video or the
number of different IP addresses watching a given video. Unfortu-
nately, as the authors acknowledge, they do not count with a ground
truth dataset to validate their designed solution as legitimate views
cannot be distinguished from fake ones in their dataset. In contrast
to this work, our study focuses on five major video portals, includ-
ing YouTube, the most important video platform worldwide, and
pursues a different goal. We propose a methodology to generate
ground truth scenarios so that we can evaluate the performance (and
unveil basic functionality principles) of different video portals’ audit
systems for both the number of counted and monetized views. As
our methodology is extensible to other video platforms, the authors
from [17] could use it to validate their proposed solution in their
considered video platform.
8. ETHICAL ASPECTS AND FEEDBACK
FROM THE INDUSTRY
While, to the best of our knowledge, there is not a methodology
that could obtain the results presented in the paper without any
effect on advertisers and/or video portals, we would like to highlight
that the experiments performed in this paper have an extremely low
impact on both video portals and advertisers.
Video portals have to dedicate storage resources to host our videos
and bandwidth to serve views to the probes. However, the number
of videos uploaded and views generated in the experiments is very
small (negligible in comparison with the volume managed by these
portals) and therefore has practically no impact on the operation of
the services.
Some advertisers have lost money during the experiments by hav-
ing their ads shown in the videos viewed by the probes. However,
based on the reported revenue by Google AdSense accounts asso-
ciated to the videos, we can confirm that the total monetary losses
produced by our experiments for advertisers are estimated to be
lower than 6e. These losses are distributed across all those advertis-
ers having their ads exposed in the videos, and thus the individual
economical impact on each of them is negligible.
In addition, we would like to highlight that we have not received
any payments while running these experiments, and all the statistics
we report, were retrieved from the YouTube Analytics channel page,
Google AdWords page and the Dailymotion Publisher page.
Finally, we have reported our findings to YouTube and Dailymo-
tion. YouTube has contacted us via email, stating that they recognize
the validity of our results, and have not indicated any ethical con-
cerns with our methodology. We plan to present the Dailymotion
feedback and explanations, once we receive them. Advertisers have
also reacted positively to our research after the technical report of
this work attracted media attention, and was published by several or-
ganizations, including the Financial Times [81], The Guardian [82],
Business Insider [83] or the BBC [84]. Major advertising compa-
nies and associations have welcomed the work, without raising any
ethical concerns. Based on our results, they have urged Google and
other major players to increase their transparency, when accounting
for advertising expenditure, as well as to more effectively address
the problem of fraud in online advertising [31, 32].
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one to pro-
pose a set of tools to monitor and audit the view audit systems of
online video portals, and enable independent and external parties
to measure their performance. The application of the tools and
methodology to the view counting behavior of five different video
portals has highlighted some interesting observations. We find that
only YouTube deploys a sufficiently discriminative view audit sys-
tems for the public view counter. All the other portals studied are
susceptible to very naïve view inflation attacks. Clearly, this raises
a problem for users with regard to the accuracy of the numbers that
are reported by these portals.
A more careful analysis of YouTube’s view audit systems has
revealed that it is susceptible to attacks that introduce some ran-
domness to the viewer behavior, including the use of multiple User-
Agents, Referrers, multiple IP addresses, or machines within a large
NATed network. These are traits that a knowledgeable attacker
would be able to configure easily, and we have been reported to be
common in large scale attacks using botnets. YouTube is consis-
tently more permissive in the counts for monetized views, when
compared to the public view counters. Specifically, fake views are
penalized and not counted by the public view counter, but can still
be monetized, i.e., have paid for ads delivered in them, and counted
in the video owner’s monetized views. While YouTube is shown
to strive to protect its users and clients, for example by reacting
quickly when suspicious behavior is identified, we speculate that its
setup seems to place an unnecessary burden of risk on advertisers.
For example, fake views can be discounted equally for public and
monetized counters, but they are not.
Finally, our analysis in this paper reinforce the call by industry
for (i) consistent and independently measurable principles on how
[Supply sources (SSPs/exchanges, ad networks, and publishers)]
should identify and expunge fraudulent traffic and (ii)more efficient
antifraud mechanisms. In future work, we intend to refine and better
scale the tools, and methods developed here, and explore how to
make them available to the wider community.
References
[1] The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), “IAB internet advertising
revenue report, 2014 full year results.” http://www.iab.net/media/file/
IAB_Internet_Advertising_Revenue_Report_FY_2014.pdf. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[2] eMarketer, “As Barriers Tumble, Video Marketing Adoption Grows.”
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Barriers-Tumble-Video-
Marketing-Adoption-Grows/1010374, 2014. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[3] eMarketer, “Online Video Advertising Moves Front and Center.”
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Online-Video-Advertising-
Moves-Front-Center/1009886, May 2013. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[4] W. Luttrell, “Only The Buy-Side Can Solve Our Fraud Problem.”
http://www.adexchanger.com/data-driven-thinking/only-the-buy-
side-can-solve-our-fraud-problem/, 2013. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[5] S. Vranica, “A ‘Crisis’ in Online Ads: One-Third of Traffic Is Bogus.”
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304026304579453253860786362, 2014. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[6] Facebook Help Center, “Is facebook ad likes campaign a fraud?.”
https://www.facebook.com/help/community/question/?id=
10101650210067625, 2014. Last accessed 15/10/2015.
[7] A. Neal and S. Kouwenhoven, “Quantifying online advertising fraud:
Ad-click bots vs humans,” tech. rep., Oxford Bio Chronometrics,
January 2015.
[8] Solve Media, “Solve Media Survey.” http://news.solvemedia.com/
post/74832974631/solve-media-bot-survey-2014, January 2014. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[9] G. Sloane, “Fraud Alert: Millions of Video Views Faked in
Sophisticated New Bot Scam.”
http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/fraud-alert-millions-
video-views-faked-sophisticated-new-bot-scam-156883, 2014. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[10] A. Kantrowitz, “Ad-Fraud Operation Fools Detection Companies,
Nets Millions.” http://adage.com/article/digital/ad-fraud-operation-
fools-detection-companies-nets-millions/293929/, 2014. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[11] J. Kirk, “Malware campaign inflated views of pro-Russia videos.”
http://www.techworld.com.au/article/574002/malware-campaign-
inflated-views-pro-russia-videos/, May 2015. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[12] ANA and White Ops, “The Bot Baseline: Fraud in Digital
Advertising.” https://www.ana.net/getfile/21853, December 2014.
Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[13] V. Dave, S. Guha, and Y. Zhang, “Viceroi: Catching click-spam in
search ad networks,” ACM CCS, 2013.
[14] A. Metwally, D. Agrawal, and A. El Abbadi, “Detectives: Detecting
coalition hit inflation attacks in advertising networks streams,” ACM
WWW, 2007.
[15] B. Stone-Gross, R. Stevens, A. Zarras, R. Kemmerer, C. Kruegel, and
G. Vigna, “Understanding fraudulent activities in online ad exchanges,”
ACM IMC, 2011.
[16] The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), “Trustworthy Supply
Chain: Anti-Fraud Working Group.”
http://www.iab.net/about_the_iab/recent_press_releases/
press_release_archive/press_release/pr-091614, 2014. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[17] L. Chen, Y. Zhou, and D. M. Chiu, “Analysis and detection of fake
views in online video services,” ACM TOMM, vol. 11, 2015.
[18] C. Kang, “ The real reasons why YouTube’s 5 biggest stars became
millionaires.” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2015/07/23/how-these-5-youtube-stars-became-millionaires-and-
why-you-wont-be-joining-them-anytime-soon/, 2015. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[19] C. Tripputi, “Tubrosa threat drives millions of views to scammers’
YouTube gaming videos.”
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/tubrosa-threat-drives-
millions-views-scammers-youtube-gaming-videos, 2015. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[20] YouTube Help, “Missing YouTube Views.”
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/4646474?hl=en, 2015.
Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[21] C. Hoffberger, “YouTube strips Universal and Sony of 2 billion fake
views.” http://www.dailydot.com/news/youtube-universal-sony-fake-
views-black-hat/, 2012. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[22] AdWords Help, “Cost-per-view (CPV).”
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/2472735?hl=en. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[23] TubeMogul, “Video Advertising Playbook.”
https://www.tubemogul.com/marketing/
TubeMogul_Video_Ad_Playbook.pdf, 2014. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[24] Supreme Traffic Bot, “Traffic Generation & Automation, Made
Easy....” http://www.supremetrafficbot.com/. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[25] The Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), “Anti-Fraud Principles and
Proposed Taxonomy.” http://www.iab.net/media/file/
IAB_Anti_Fraud_Principles_and_Taxonomy.pdf, September 2014.
Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[26] “Viewbros.” http://www.viewbros.com/. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[27] “QQTUBE.” https://www.qqtube.com/. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[28] “Buildmyviews.” http://www.buildmyviews.org. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[29] B. Elgin, M. Riley, D. Kocieniewski, and J. Brustein, “The Fake
Traffic Schemes That Are Rotting the Internet.”
http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-click-fraud/, 2015. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[30] R. Fenton, “Has YouTube come of age for modern advertisers?.”
http://www.theguardian.com/media-network/2015/oct/05/youtube-
brands-demand-views-transparency, 2015. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[31] R. Cookson, “WPP urges Google to tackle problem of fake ad views.”
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f9da727c-6207-11e5-9846-
de406ccb37f2.html, 2015. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[32] The Incorporated Society of British Advertisers (ISBA), “’Bots’,
YouTube and advertisers.”
http://www.isba.org.uk/news/2015/09/24/’bots’-and-youtube, 2015.
Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[33] P. Pfeiffenberger, “Keeping YouTube Views Authentic.”
http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.co.uk/2014/02/keeping-
youtube-views-authentic.html, February 2014. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[34] S. Dredge, “Google goes to war on ‘fraudulent’ YouTube video views.”
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/feb/05/youtube-fake-
views-counts-google, 2014. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[35] “Youtube Bot Views.”
http://traffic-bots.com/youtube-bots/youtube-bot-views/. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[36] “YouTube Bot Views Proxies.” https://listingdock.com/Computer-
Software/2600/YouTube-Bot-Views-Proxies-Random-Referrer. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[37] Sysomos, “A Look Inside Online Video Engagement - Part I.”
https://www.sysomos.com/reports/video, 2009. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[38] “Online Video market share in the Alexa top 1M.”
http://www.datanyze.com/market-share/online-video/, 2015. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[39] Nielsen, “May 2012 - Top U.S. Online Video Sites.”
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2012/may-2012-top-u-
s-online-video-sites.html. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[40] Statista, “Leading internet multimedia portals in the United States in
August 2014, based on market share of visits.”
http://www.statista.com/statistics/266201/us-market-share-of-
leading-internet-video-portals/, 2014. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[41] “Comparison of video hosting services.” https:
//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_video_hosting_services,
2015. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[42] D. Gayle, “YouTube cancels billions of music industry video views
after finding they were fake or ’dead’.”
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2254181/YouTube-
wipes-billions-video-views-finding-faked-music-industry.html,
2012. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[43] YouTube Help, “Views report.”
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1714329. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[44] YouTube, “Ad Performance report for partners.”
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2423005?hl=en. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[45] Vimeo, “Vimeo - Get Advanced Statistics.” http://vimeo.com/stats.
Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[46] “Selenium webdriver.” http://docs.seleniumhq.org/projects/webdriver/.
[47] “Squid proxy server.” http://www.squid-cache.org/.
[48] B. Chun, D. Culler, T. Roscoe, A. Bavier, L. Peterson,
M. Wawrzoniak, and M. Bowman, “Planetlab: An overlay testbed for
broad-coverage services,” ACM SIGCOMM CCR, vol. 33, July 2003.
[49] A. Finamore, M. Mellia, M. M. Munafò, R. Torres, and S. G. Rao,
“Youtube everywhere: Impact of device and infrastructure synergies on
user experience,” ACM IMC, 2011.
[50] L. Chen, Y. Zhou, and D. M. Chiu, “Fake view analytics in online
video services,” ACM NOSSDAV, 2013.
[51] S. Englehardt, D. Reisman, C. Eubank, P. Zimmerman, J. Mayer,
A. Narayanan, and E. W. Felten, “Cookies that give you away: The
surveillance implications of web tracking,” ACM WWW, 2015.
[52] M. P. Collins, T. J. Shimeall, S. Faber, J. Janies, R. Weaver,
M. De Shon, and J. Kadane, “Using uncleanliness to predict future
botnet addresses,” ACM IMC, 2007.
[53] A. Ramachandran and N. Feamster, “Understanding the network-level
behavior of spammers,” ACM SIGCOMM CCR, vol. 36, Aug. 2006.
[54] R. Cuevas, M. Kryczka, A. Cuevas, S. Kaune, C. Guerrero, and
R. Rejaie, “Unveiling the incentives for content publishing in popular
bittorrent portals,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 21, Oct. 2013.
[55] B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz, “Internet advertising and
the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth
of keywords,” American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 1, 2007.
[56] AdWords Help, “About invalid traffic.” https:
//support.google.com/adwords/answer/2549113?ctx=tltp&hl=en. Last
accessed 8/10/2015.
[57] F. Soldo, K. Argyraki, and A. Markopoulou, “Optimal source-based
filtering of malicious traffic,” IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw., vol. 20, no. 2,
2012.
[58] Z. Chen, C. Ji, and P. Barford, “Spatial-temporal characteristics of
internet malicious sources,” IEEE INFOCOM, 2008.
[59] S. Venkataraman, A. Blum, D. Song, S. Sen, and O. Spatscheck,
“Tracking dynamic sources of malicious activity at internet scale,” in
NIPS, Curran Associates, Inc., 2009.
[60] S. Staniford, J. A. Hoagland, and J. M. McAlerney, “Practical
automated detection of stealthy portscans,” J. Comput. Secur., vol. 10,
July 2002.
[61] T. Peng, C. Leckie, and K. Ramamohanarao, “Proactively detecting
distributed denial of service attacks using source ip address
monitoring.,” in NETWORKING, vol. 3042 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, 2004.
[62] R. Cuevas, M. Kryczka, R. González, A. Cuevas, and A. Azcorra,
“Torrentguard: Stopping scam and malware distribution in the
bittorrent ecosystem,” Comput. Netw., vol. 59, Feb. 2014.
[63] M. Gjoka, M. Kurant, C. Butts, and A. Markopoulou, “Practical
recommendations on crawling online social networks,” IEEE JSAC,
vol. 29, October 2011.
[64] A. Karasaridis, B. Rexroad, and D. Hoeflin, “Wide-scale botnet
detection and characterization,” USENIX HotBots, 2007.
[65] Y. Xie, F. Yu, K. Achan, R. Panigrahy, G. Hulten, and I. Osipkov,
“Spamming botnets: Signatures and characteristics,” ACM SIGCOMM
CCR, vol. 38, Aug. 2008.
[66] K. Lee, J. Caverlee, and S. Webb, “Uncovering social spammers:
Social honeypots + machine learning,” ACM SIGIR, 2010.
[67] J. Zhang, R. Zhang, Y. Zhang, and G. Yan, “On the impact of social
botnets for spam distribution and digital-influence manipulation,”
CNS, 2013.
[68] O. Thonnard and M. Dacier, “A strategic analysis of spam botnets
operations,” ACM CEAS, 2011.
[69] K. Thomas and D. Nicol, “The koobface botnet and the rise of social
malware,” in MALWARE, 2010, 2010.
[70] G. Stringhini, T. Holz, B. Stone-Gross, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna,
“Botmagnifier: Locating spambots on the internet.,” in USENIX
Security Symposium, 2011.
[71] G. Stringhini, O. Hohlfeld, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna, “The harvester,
the botmaster, and the spammer: On the relations between the
different actors in the spam landscape,” ACM ASIA CCS, 2014.
[72] L. Bilge, D. Balzarotti, W. Robertson, E. Kirda, and C. Kruegel,
“Disclosure: Detecting botnet command and control servers through
large-scale netflow analysis,” ACM ACSAC, 2012.
[73] Y. Boshmaf, I. Muslukhov, K. Beznosov, and M. Ripeanu, “The
socialbot network: When bots socialize for fame and money,” ACM
ACSAC, 2011.
[74] L. Bilge, T. Strufe, D. Balzarotti, and E. Kirda, “All your contacts are
belong to us: Automated identity theft attacks on social networks,”
ACM WWW, 2009.
[75] Z. Li, K. Zhang, Y. Xie, F. Yu, and X. Wang, “Knowing your enemy:
Understanding and detecting malicious web advertising,” ACM CCS,
2012.
[76] B. Miller, P. Pearce, C. Grier, C. Kreibich, and V. Paxson, “What’s
clicking what? techniques and innovations of today’s clickbots,”
Springer-Verlag DIMVA, 2011.
[77] V. Dave, S. Guha, and Y. Zhang, “Measuring and fingerprinting
click-spam in ad networks,” ACM SIGCOMM CCR, vol. 42, October
2012.
[78] P. Snyder and C. Kanich, “No please, after you: Detecting fraud in
affiliate marketing networks,” WEIS, 2015.
[79] K. Thomas, E. Bursztein, C. Grier, G. Ho, N. Jagpal, A. Kapravelos,
D. McCoy, A. Nappa, V. Paxson, P. Pearce, N. Provos, and M. A.
Rajab, “Ad injection at scale: Assessing deceptive advertisement
modifications,” in IEEE S&P, 2015.
[80] W. Meng, X. Xing, A. Sheth, U. Weinsberg, and W. Lee, “Your online
interests: Pwned! a pollution attack against targeted advertising,”
ACM CCS, 2014.
[81] R. Cookson, “Google charges for YouTube ads even when viewed by
robots.” http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/53ac3fd0-604e-11e5-a28b-
50226830d644.html, 2015. Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[82] B. Quinn, “ Google charges advertisers for fake YouTube video views,
say researchers .” http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/sep/
23/google-advertisers-fake-youtube-video-views-adwords-bot, 2015.
Last accessed 8/10/2015.
[83] J. D’Onfro, “Google charges for YouTube ads even when it thinks a
robot viewed them, says study.” http://uk.businessinsider.com/google-
charges-advertisers-for-robot-views-2015-9, 2015. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
[84] K. Rawlinson, “Google ’charges for YouTube adverts viewed by bots’.”
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-34335971, 2015. Last accessed
8/10/2015.
